State of Utah v. Jose Dejesus : Brief of Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1984 
State of Utah v. Jose Dejesus : Brief of Respondent 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.David L. Wilkinson and Dave B. Thompson; Attorneys for 
Respondent 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. DeJesus, No. 19014 (1984). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4554 
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
5p,Tf: OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 19014 
,]()SE DEJESUS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT RENDERED IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, THE 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, JUDGE, 
PRESIDING. 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVE B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assn. 
333 South second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
FILED 
IN TllF. eillPPF.ME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
• 1 r 1 ,,. rrTAH, 
-v-
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case No. 19014 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT RENDERED IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, THE 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, JUDGE, 
PRESIDING. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVE B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assn. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
11Ml 1H OF THE NATIJRE OF THE CASE. 
SOUGHT ON APPEAL. 
qATEMENT OF FACTS • . . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE VERDICT. • . • • • ••.•••• 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION ON 
Page 
1 
1 
2 
3 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION. 5 
cnNCL!JS I ON . • • • • 7 
CASES CITED 
State v. Bingham, Utah, __ P.2d __ , No. 18774 (decided 
June 13, 1984) • • • • • • • • 5, 6 
State v. Howell, Utah, 649 P. 2d 91 ( 1982). 4 
State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P. 2d 56 (1982). 5 
State v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P. 2d 942 (1982). 3 
State v. Newton, Utah, 681 P. 2d 833 (1984) 6 
State v. Schaffer, Utah, 6 38 P.2d 1185 ( 1981). 6 
State v. Reed:i::, Utah, 681 P. 2d 1251 (1984) 5 
United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 5 
STATUTES CITED 
"Lah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 ( 1978) 1 
TN THf: SIJPRF:ME COTJRT OF' THE STATF: OF' UTAH 
'I ''"' llTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
lCISf; llE-JESUS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19014 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, -Jose De-Jesus, was charged with aggravated 
robte ry, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302 (1978). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a jury trial on -January 17 and 18, 1983 in the 
Third -Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, -Judge, presiding, appellant was 
found guilty of aggravated robbery. Appellant was sentenced 
tu the Utah state Prison for a term of not less than five 
years to life and fined $1000.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judyrnent and sentence of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
on the afternoon of May 3, 1QR2, Miriam Davis 
her daughter, Shauna, were working in Fankhauswer Jewelry, 
store in Salt Lake City (T. 14-15, 60-61). Appellant anc1 t 
male companions appeared outside the store and looked in 
through the window (T. 23-25, 64). As the men entered the 
store, appellant pulled a shotgun from underneath his coat, 
pointed it at Miriam Davis, and exclaimed, "This is a holdup" 
(T. 26, 66-67). After asking where the "big diamonds" were, 
appellant ordered Miriam and a customer to lie down on the 
floor and then directed Shauna to unlock several showcases so 
that his companions could remove the merchandise (T. 26, 
67-69). Appellant also forced Shauna to show him where the 
cash drawer was (T. 67, 80). The robbers remained in the 
store for approximately ten minutes and then left (T. 29). 
Shortly thereafter, police responded to a silent 
alarm triggered when appellant and his accomplices entered the 
store (T. 29). A large amount of merchandise and the contents 
of the cash drawer had been taken (T. 30-32). The police 
recovered from several of the display counters latent 
palmprints and fingerprints that matched appellant's (T. 
87-88, 107-110). Three days after the robbery, Miriam Davis 
identified appellant in a photo lineup (T. 45, 58). 
At trial, both Miriam and Shauna Davis positively 
identified appellant as the man armed with a shotgun who 
entered the jewelry store and robbed it (T. 26-26, 66). Jn"" 
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.f I it t.n establish an alibi, appellant introduced into 
1•1Pnce an airline ticket allegedly purchased by appellant in 
""k \ity two weeks after the robt:ery occurred (T. 
182-183). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE VERDICT. 
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting a conviction, this Court has applied 
the following standard of review: 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in 
the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, and will only interfere when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
that a reasonable man could not possibly 
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. We also view in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict those 
facts which can be reasonably inferred 
from the evidence presented to it. 
State v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982) (citations 
omitted) . 
Appellant's contention that the evidence was 
insufficient as a matter of law to support the verdict is 
entirely without merit. He claims that the evidence he 
presented with respect to an airline ticket purchased in New 
Y-,rk City on May 17, 1982, two weeks after the robbery, must 
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have raised a reasonable doubt as to his presenct' in salt 1 ,lf, 
City on May 3, 1982, the date of the rr>bbery. This ar'Jllnh'"' 
is based on two erroneous assurnµtions -- ( 1) that the cvi•J<,,1 
established that the airline ticket was actually purchased tiy 
appellant, and ( 2) that the evidence of the purchase 
eliminated the possibility that appellant was in Salt Lake 
City on May 3. A representative of United Airlines, the 
airline that sold the ticket, testified that the ticket was 
issued to an "I." or "J." DeJesus and that there was no way of 
knowing whether it was actually issued to appellant (T. 
182-183, 188). Moreover, even if appellant did purchase the 
ticket on May 17, that certainly did not preclude his presence 
in Salt Lake City on May 3. The trier of fact simply was was 
not obligated to believe the evidence most favorable to 
appellant rather than that presented in opposition by the 
State; and the existence of contradictory evidence or of 
conflicting inferences does not warrant upsetting the verdict. 
State v. Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982). 
The positive in-court identification of appellant as 
the robber by the two victims and the photo lineup 
identification of appellant by one of the victims, coupled 
with the recovery of appellant's palmprints and fingerprints 
at the scene of the crime, constituted sufficient evidence to 
support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant W0 ' 
in the jewelry store on the date in question and that he 
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the crime charyed. The evidence simply was not so 
1 iri•J and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not 
1 ,s·,Jt>ly have found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable 
duu ht. 
POINT I I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION ON 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION. 
Appellant's requested jury instruction on eyewitness 
identification (R. 59-61) is modeled after that recommended in 
United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
This Court has repeatedly held that a "Telfaire" instruction 
is not mandatory in all instances where eyewitness 
identification is crucial to the case. Instead, the decision 
of whether to give a Telfaire instruction is discretionary 
with the trial court. See State v. Bingham, Utah, P.2d_ 
No. 18774 (decided June 13, 1984); State v. Reedy, Utah, 681 
P.2d 1251 (1984); State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982). 
As noted in Bingham: 
Jury instructions must be considered as a 
whole. "When taken as a whole if they 
fairly tender the case to the jury, the 
fact that one or more of the instructions, 
standing alone, are not as full or 
accurate as they might have been is not 
reversible error." State v. Brooks, Utah, 
638 P.2d 537, 542 (1981) (citation 
omitted). 
Slip op. at p. 3. 
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The trial court's instructions ir1 appellant's Crlcec 
(see, particularly, Instructions No. 1 and 7 (R. h7, 71J)) 
fully informed the jury that the State had the burden ot 
proving every element of the offense charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Instruction No. 10 (R. 73) instructed t1 1 .. 
jurors that they were the sole judges of the credibility o[ 
the witnesses and set forth specific guidelines for 
determining a witness's credibility. As in Bingham, the 
instruct ions, taken as a whole, "adequately advised the jury 
on the law pertaining to this case." Bingham, slip op. 
4, citing State v. Schaffer, Utah, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (1981). 
Significantly, two eyewitnesses (i.e., Miriam and Shauna 
Davis) positively identified appellant as the robter; and 
there was additional physical evidence linking appellant to 
the crime (i.e., appellant's palmprints and fingerprints found 
at the scene of the crime). Thus, this does not appear to be 
the kind of case identified by Justice Durham in her 
concurring opinion in State v. Newton, Utah, 681 P.2d 833 
(1984), where "an instruction on the dangers of eyewitness 
identification is most appropriate." 681 P.2d at 834. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to 
'i'l""'t the jury's guilty verdict. Further, based on this 
1rt's recent decisions concerning "Telfaire" instructions, 
ihP trial court's refusal to give appellant's requested 
identification instruction to the jury was not 
error. 
affirmed. 
19 84 . 
Therefore, the judgment of the trial court should be 
-cc-
RESPECTFULLY subnitted this day of August, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
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